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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION‘S DECISIONS TO 
ENFORCE, BUT NOT DEFEND, DOMA § 3 
Robert J. Delahunty* 
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder advised Congress 
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would no longer defend § 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)1—the Act of Congress that defines 
―marriage‖ for federal purposes as ―a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife.‖2  The Attorney General stated: ―[T]he 
President and I have concluded that classifications based on sexual 
orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex 
couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is 
unconstitutional.‖3  The Attorney General noted that ―there is substantial 
circuit court authority applying rational basis review to sexual-orientation 
classifications.‖4  Furthermore, he acknowledged that the DOJ previously 
defended § 3 in circuits that ultimately applied rational basis review to 
classifications by sexual orientation.5  Nonetheless, in two pending 
challenges to § 3 in the Second Circuit—which had not ruled on the 
controlling standard of review—the President instructed the DOJ not to 
defend the challenged section.  The Attorney General added: 
 
Notwithstanding this determination, the President has 
informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced by 
the Executive Branch.  To that end, the President has 
instructed Executive agencies to continue to comply with 
Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive‘s 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial 
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1
  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) (link). 
2
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3
  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to the Honorable John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Speaker], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (link). 
4
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  See id.; see also Memorandum from Paul Benjamin Linton, Special Counsel, The Thomas More 
Soc‘y, A Response to the Administration‘s Decision Not to Defend Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act 13 & n.11 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.alliancealert.org/2011/20110301.pdf 
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branch renders a definitive verdict against the law‘s 
constitutionality.  This course of action respects the actions 
of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it 
recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the 
constitutional claims raised.6 
 
Obviously, the Obama Administration‘s decisions not to defend the 
constitutionality of DOMA—but at the same time, to enforce it—raise 
significant constitutional questions. 
I. DOES THE EXECUTIVE HAVE 1) A DUTY NOT TO ENFORCE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, 2) A DISCRETIONARY POWER NOT TO 
ENFORCE THEM, OR 3) A DUTY TO ENFORCE THEM? 
Plainly, the Executive has no duty to enforce an unconstitutional 
statute.  The Executive is charged with the faithful execution of ―the law,‖ 
and an unconstitutional statute is not law. 
The harder question is whether the Executive has a duty not to enforce 
an unconstitutional statute, or the discretion to decide whether to enforce it 
or not.  Leading constitutional scholars have taken different positions on the 
matter.  Walter Dellinger, whose views the current DOJ appears to be 
tracking, has maintained that the Executive has discretion not to enforce an 
unconstitutional law, but not a duty not to do so.7  Sai Prakash, on the other 
hand, argues that the Executive is duty-bound not to enforce an 
unconstitutional law.8 
Prakash‘s reasons, in brief, are these: First, an unconstitutional law is 
simply void, and thus not ―law.‖  The President has no more a right to 
enforce such a ―law‖ than he has to enforce the statute of a state or foreign 
nation.9  Second, the President has taken an oath to preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution, and enforcing an unconstitutional law would 
undercut that oath by subordinating it to an unconstitutional law.10  Third, 
the Faithful Execution Clause and the Supremacy Clause, combined, also 




  Letter to Speaker, supra note 3 (referring to the President‘s instruction to the DOJ not to defend 
§ 3 of DOMA in Windsor v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 8435(BSJ)(JCF), 2011 WL 3422841 (S.D.N.Y. 
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Management, No. 310 CV 1750 VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010), 2010 WL 4483820). 
7
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L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008) (link). 
9
  Id. 
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  Id. at 1617. 
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I believe that Prakash is correct.  In addition to Prakash‘s powerful 
textual and structural reasons, sound policy supports his claims.  To assume 
that the President has the ―discretion‖ to decide whether to enforce an 
unconstitutional law or not is to expand the President‘s power in a way that 
invites opportunism and irresponsibility.  The President can pick and 
choose among unconstitutional statutes and decide which of them to 
execute—probably with an eye on his or her political fortunes.  On the 
other hand, holding that the President has an affirmative duty not to enforce 
an unconstitutional law is to encourage a more disciplined and careful use 
of executive power.  Presidents will be required to make constitutionally 
principled enforcement decisions regardless of their political effect.  
Presidents will be forced to become more circumspect and reflective in 
categorizing statutes as ―unconstitutional‖ when the practical consequences 
of such a determination are inescapable. 
II. IF THE EXECUTIVE HAS A DUTY NOT TO ENFORCE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS, IS IT NONETHELESS BOUND (OR AT LIBERTY) 
TO DEFEND THEM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION? 
If a law is unconstitutional, the Executive has a duty not to enforce it.  
Therefore, the Executive must not enforce it even if the courts uphold it.  
The fact that the courts uphold a law as constitutional does not entail that it 
is constitutional.  Contrary to Cooper v. Aaron,12 the Constitution is not 
necessarily what the Supreme Court says it is: the Constitution‘s meaning is 
not the same as the interpretation of that meaning, even by high judicial 
authority.  Only on that understanding can we explain why the Court 
itself—though less often than it should—has confessed error and overruled 
mistaken constitutional precedents. 
Because the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution is not 
necessarily correct, and also because the Executive is a co-equal branch 
with its own sworn responsibility to uphold the Constitution, the Executive 
has a duty to make its own, independent determination of a statute‘s 
constitutionality.  Executives in the past have respectfully disagreed with 
the Supreme Court‘s views on the Constitution.  True, in the most extreme 
case, an irresoluble difference between the Supreme Court and the President 
might lead to a constitutional impasse, possibly provoking a constitutional 
crisis.  But that kind of crisis has not happened in our country‘s history, 
even in the dispute between the Supreme Court and President Nixon over 
the disclosure of the Watergate tapes.13  The explanation probably is that 
that the political costs to the President of a frontal assault on the Court have 
usually been too high. 
 
12
  358 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1958) (asserting that ―the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land‖ under the Supremacy Clause) 
(link). 
13
  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (link). 
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If the Executive has a duty not to enforce an unconstitutional law even 
if the courts uphold it, it follows that there is a practical reason for the 
Executive not to defend an unconstitutional law from challenge.  If the 
Executive‘s defense is successful in persuading the courts, the Executive 
will still be bound to disregard the courts‘ mistaken decision. 
Furthermore, if the Executive defends a statute that is unconstitutional, 
it increases the likelihood that the courts will heed that defense and sustain 
the law—thus making it more likely that an unconstitutional law will be 
treated as if it were constitutional, and raising the chances of an 
unnecessary confrontation between the branches.  This, again, supports the 
proposition that if a law is unconstitutional, the Executive should not 
defend it. 
III. WHAT IF THE EXECUTIVE IS REASONABLY, BUT NOT COMPLETELY, 
CERTAIN THAT A LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
This of course is the normal situation.  In nearly all realistic scenarios, 
the Executive cannot and will not affirm categorically that a challenged 
statute is unconstitutional—certainly not to the point of maintaining that it 
will disregard even a Supreme Court ruling that upholds the law.  The usual 
situation is one in which the Executive will take the position that the statute, 
by its best lights, is unconstitutional. 
Does the Executive have a duty to enforce the law in that situation?  
The analysis given thus far does not provide a conclusive answer because 
there is a logical space between a law that is unconstitutional and a law that 
the Executive reasonably believes to be unconstitutional.  Just as the courts 
may be in error about the constitutionality of a statute, so too may the 
Executive be in error.  And just as the Court may overrule a constitutional 
precedent, a later occupant of the Presidency may also reverse (and correct) 
a predecessor‘s view of a statute‘s constitutionality. 
In Prakash‘s view, the risk that the President ―will make constitutional 
errors in the course of deciding whether the Constitution permits him to 
enforce particular statutes . . . hardly means that the President lacks a duty 
to disregard statutes he regards as unconstitutional.‖14  There are at least two 
ways to understand this view.  One way has to do with higher-order beliefs 
about beliefs.  The other has to do with the degrees of certainty of 
particular, first-order beliefs.  Prakash might mean that the President‘s 
general belief that some of his particular beliefs on the unconstitutionality 
of statutes do not relieve him from the duty of acting on his belief about a 
particular statute‘s unconstitutionality in a particular case.  That is true.  But 
the more relevant question is whether a President‘s belief that a particular 
statute is unconstitutional may not be so tempered by countervailing 
arguments in favor of its constitutionality that he may be justified in 
 
14
  Prakash, supra note 8, at 1643. 
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defending it, at least for the purpose of seeking the views of courts and 
opposing litigants.  A mother might believe that her son is indeed guilty of a 
crime, but nonetheless defend him because she expected that that conduct 
would bring further evidence to light that bore on the truth of her belief. 
When the Executive is uncertain, there are no bright-line constitutional 
rules to guide its behavior.  Instead there would seem to be, at best, 
protocols that have ―constitutional underpinnings.‖15  The past practice of 
the Executive branch—including the Executive‘s own self-conscious 
reflections on that practice—provides some assistance in formulating those 
protocols. 
If the Executive is strongly convinced that a law is unconstitutional, 
but not so convinced that it would decline to enforce the law even if the 
Supreme Court sustained the law on what the Executive considered 
adequate grounds, then the Executive should continue to enforce the law if 
such enforcement is necessary to secure a judicial opinion on the subject of 
the law’s constitutionality. Thus, the Executive should not moot out such a 
case.  The Executive may thereafter take the judiciary‘s opinions into 
account (including concurring and dissenting opinions) when making its 
own final, independent decision about enforcing the law.  The courts‘ 
opinions may bring arguments to light that the Executive had not 
considered before, or to which it had given insufficient weight.  The 
Executive may also give more weight to a unanimous decision than to a 
badly split one.  Listening to the views of the courts is a facet of a 
reasonable process of error-avoidance that the Executive could justifiably 
choose to follow in reaching its own, independent constitutional judgments.  
The Supreme Court typically follows the same course by waiting for several 
circuit courts to express opinions on a contentious constitutional question 
before ultimately deciding it. 
If, however, the litigation challenging the statute can go forward even 
when the Executive discontinues enforcement (perhaps because 
nonenforcement does not bring relief to litigants in pending cases), then the 
Executive should cease to enforce the statute. 
In most cases, therefore, it would seem that the Executive has a duty 
not to enforce a statute that it finds unconstitutional.  That duty would seem 
even more binding when the Executive had a firm, reasoned conviction that 
the statute was unconstitutional. 
 
15
  See Banco Naçional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (―The act of state doctrine 
does, however, have ‗constitutional‘ underpinnings.‖) (link).  The judge-made act of state doctrine 
derived from, although it was not impelled by, the constitutional allocation of authority between the 
Executive and the courts in the sphere of foreign affairs.  Here too, the appropriate guidelines for the 
Executive‘s use of its power should be rooted in and serve basic constitutional policies and values, even 
though the Constitution does not in itself dictate what those guidelines are. 
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IV. WHAT ABOUT DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
STATUTE IN THOSE SITUATIONS? 
These conclusions do not yet reach the question of the Executive‘s 
duty to defend what it reasonably believes to be an unconstitutional statute.  
Could the Executive have a duty not to enforce such a statute but 
nonetheless be at liberty to defend it against a constitutional challenge? 
It seems reasonably clear that the Executive could have a duty not to 
enforce what it determined to be an unconstitutional statute, and 
nonetheless also have a right to defend that statute, in some limited 
circumstances—if its defense of the statute were necessary to obtain a 
judicial ruling on the statute‘s constitutionality, and the Executive 
considered such a ruling advisable or important.16  But in many cases, the 
Executive can cede the defense of a statute to other, capable hands (as has 
happened in the litigation over § 3 and in other classic cases of 
nondefense17).  If the Executive‘s decision not to defend a statute does not 
preclude the courts from considering and ruling on a reasoned and effective 
defense of it, and if the Executive‘s nonenforcement of the statute does not 
moot out all challenges or otherwise prevent cases from going forward, then 
there would seem to be no reason why the Executive should not decline 
both to enforce and to defend the statute. 
In fact, the Executive‘s decision not to enforce a statute that it has 
concluded it cannot defend is one test of the Executive‘s good faith in 
claiming to find the statute unconstitutional.  A declination to defend a 
statute while still enforcing it will normally incur much lower political costs 
for the Executive than a decision neither to defend nor to enforce it.  A 
nonenforcement decision typically has consequences that are immediately 
visible to the public.  Here, for instance, nonenforcement would mean that 
same-sex couples married under state law could receive federal benefits 
previously available only to heterosexual married couples.  A decision not 
to defend, in itself, carries much less political exposure for the Executive.  
If the courts eventually strike down a statute that the Executive has enforced 
but not defended, the Executive can deflect criticism for the statute‘s 
subsequent nonenforcement onto the judiciary.  If, on the other hand, the 
courts uphold the statute, the Executive can mitigate any political damages 
for not having defended it by continuing to enforce it. 
 
16
  A judicial ruling could be useful for the Executive in several ways.  The court might strike the 
statute down, thus confirming the Executive in its belief that the statute was unconstitutional.  Or the 
court might sustain the statute.  The Executive, however, might find the court‘s reasoning so 
unpersuasive that that result also confirmed its belief that the statute was unconstitutional.  Finally, the 
court might affirm the statute on grounds that the Executive, after reconsideration, found to be 
persuasive. 
17
  See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (link). 
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V. HOW SHOULD THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION‘S DECISIONS BE 
EVALUATED? 
By the standards suggested above, the Administration‘s decisions are 
incoherent and unprincipled. 
The Attorney General‘s letter demonstrates that the Obama 
Administration very firmly believes that § 3 is unconstitutional.  Mr. Holder 
writes: 
 
After careful consideration, including a review of my 
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a 
number of factors, including a documented history of 
discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation 
should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny.  The 
President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as 
applied to legally married same-sex couples, fails to meet 
that standard and is therefore unconstitutional.18 
 
Further underscoring the depth of the Administration‘s conviction that 
§ 3 is unconstitutional, the Administration‘s position rejects the clear 
preponderance of federal appellate opinion on the correct standard of 
review.  Moreover, the Attorney General also acknowledges that the DOJ is 
departing from its ―longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality 
of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their 
defense. . . .  This is a rare case where the proper course is to forego the 
defense of this statute.‖19 
Given the strength of the Administration‘s constitutional convictions 
concerning § 3, it is inexcusable for the Administration to continue to 
enforce it.  None of the justifications the Attorney General puts forward for 
continuing enforcement are remotely adequate.  To say that enforcement is 
―consistent with the Executive‘s obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed‖ is to subordinate the President‘s ―faithful execution‖ of 
the Constitution (by his best lights) to the enforcement of § 3.  Furthermore, 
the statement raises the question of how the President can be ―faithfully 
executing‖ the laws if he leaves them undefended against constitutional 
challenges. 
Equally unpersuasive is the Attorney General‘s claim that a policy of 
enforcement ―respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted 
DOMA.‖20  Either those actions demand respect—because they were fully 
constitutional—or they do not.  If they are unconstitutional, they should be 
neither enforced nor defended.  Worst of all, however, is the Attorney 
 
18
  Letter to Speaker, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
19
  Id. (emphasis added). 
20
  Id. 
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General‘s statement that a policy of nonenforcement ―recognizes the 
judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.‖21  To say 
that is to openly abdicate the Executive‘s sworn duty to reach its own, 
independent understanding of the Constitution.22 
The situation would be different if the Administration could not 
decline enforcement of Section 3 without thereby preventing the judiciary 
from hearing challenges to it—but the Attorney General does not say that, 
and it may not be true.  The situation might also be different if the 
Administration admitted that although § 3 seemed unconstitutional by its 
best lights, the Administration was sufficiently uncertain about that 
conclusion to decline to enforce the section.  But far from admitting even 
some degree of uncertainty about the section‘s unconstitutionality, Mr. 
Holder goes to considerable length to stress how certain the Administration 
is of its conclusion. 
The Administration‘s position rests ultimately on the assumption that it 
has discretion whether or not to enforce a statute that it firmly believes to 
be unconstitutional.  If the argument outlined above is correct, that premise 
is simply mistaken.  The Administration‘s decision—enforce § 3, but do not 
defend it—may make sense, as muddled compromises often do, in raw 
political terms.  In legal and constitutional terms, it is a hash. 
 
21
  Id. 
22
  Note also the Attorney General‘s statement that this is a ―rare‖ case in which it is justifiable for 
the Executive to depart from the ―longstanding‖ practice of defending Acts of Congress ―if reasonable 
arguments can be made in their defense.‖  Id.  Contrast Mr. Holder‘s prior advice to Congress in 2009 
that he would defend the constitutionality of a bill granting voting representation in the House of 
Representatives to the District of Columbia were such a bill enacted.  Carrie Johnson, Some in Justice 
Department See D.C. Vote in House as Unconstitutional, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 1, 2009, 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/31/AR2009033104426.html (link).  Media 
reports at the time stated that in that instance, Mr. Holder had disregarded the advice of his own Office 
of Legal Counsel that the bill in question was plainly unconstitutional because the Constitution reserves 
voting representation to States, and the District is not and cannot be a State.  See, e.g., id.  Instead, Mr. 
Holder relied on the advice of his Solicitor General‘s Office that the bill was not indefensible in 
litigation.  See John O. McGinnis, Commentary, An End Run Around the Rule of Law, EXECUTIVE 
WATCH, Apr. 6, 2009, http://executivewatch.net/2009/04/06 (link).  Mr. Holder is thus in the position of 
saying that he would defend the constitutionality of a plainly unconstitutional Act of Congress granting 
voting representation to the District of Columbia while not defending an Act of Congress whose 
constitutionality had been affirmed by most federal circuits and denied by none.  Mr. Holder‘s treatment 
of the two situations demonstrates that his constitutional judgments are profoundly politicized. 
